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THE CAPITAL AND CASH FLOW SOURCES AND USES OF INITIAL 






This  study  investigates  the  capital  sources  and  uses  of  firms  that  are  conducting  stock 
repurchase  transactions  for  the  first  time,  both  prior  and  subsequent  to  those  financial 
operations. We hypothesize that this capital and cash flow analysis may shed some light about 
the relative importance of some financial motivations and theoretical hypotheses in explaining 
initial stock repurchases. In particular, our findings support the risk reduction signaling and 
the dividends substitution hypotheses as the primary drivers for the initial stock repurchase 
decision. We also find that the importance of the most theoretical explanations and financial 
motivations  vary  according  to  whether  initial  repurchase  firms  are  also  conducting 
acquisitions  and  significant  divestitures,  distributing  cash  dividends,  relying  on  external 
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THE CAPITAL AND CASH FLOW SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS 





Firms use stock repurchases as an instrument of financial policy related to investment, 
financing, cash flow distribution and management compensation decisions. Presumably, firms 
define their financial policies according to the flow of economic and financial information 
they possess, which may evolve over time. To capture that flow of information directly is, of 
course, a Herculean task, if possible at all. However, we argue that this information may be 
included in a firm’s financial attributes, such as cash levels, debt ratios and several cash flow 
variables.  Therefore,  we  believe  that  both  ex-ante  and  ex-post  information  about  these 
financial  stocks  and  flows  may  help  to  explain  financial  transactions  (as  argued  by 
Jagannathan et al, 2000 and Lie, 2005, among others). In fact, some empirical studies focus 
on cash flows as an indicator of financial strength (Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan et 
al.,  2000;  Evans  et  al.,  2001).  We  agree,  but  as  Lie  (2005)  stresses,  firms  may  have 
accumulated substantial cash balances or low debt ratios despite current low operating cash 
flows. These cash accumulations or low debt ratios may arise from strong operating cash 
flows  in  the  past  or  recent  extraordinary  cash  flows,  such  as  asset  and  division  sales.  A 
complete picture of financial conditions requires not only cash flow characteristics but also 
financial stocks (or stocks of capital), like equity, leverage and cash. 
Thus, we are interested in initial stock repurchase transactions and the information 
content  conveyed  by  financial  flows  (several  operating,  extraordinary,  investment  and 
financing flows) but also by financial stocks. In this context, we hypothesize that firms initiate 
stock  repurchases  for  the  first  time  according  to  several  financial  motivations  which  are 
explained by different theoretical hypotheses, and those may be better identified if we use 
other (recent) past and future financial transactions, related to both capital and cash flow uses 
(as acquisitions and dividend payments) and capital and cash flow sources (e.g., external or 
internal,  extra  or  regular  cash  flows,  leverage  related  or  cash  related  financing  and 
divestitures). For instance, we may argue that firms engaging in substantial divestments could 
use stock repurchases with a different rationale than firms which are not making divestments.   
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The overall research question of this study is: which capital and cash flow variables 
induce firms to repurchase their own stock for the first time? Thus, this study investigates the 
capital  and  cash  flow  sources  and  uses  of  firms  that  are  conducting  stock  repurchase 
transactions for the first time, both prior and subsequent to those financial operations. We 
achieve this by decomposing the statement of cash flows in several variables with important 
financial  meaning  (operating  cash flows, extraordinary cash flows, change in debt and in 
external equity, capital expenditures, etc) and analyzing financial stocks on the balance sheet 
(cash and debt mostly) and their change over time. 
We  also  explore  the  role  of  acquisitions  and  divestitures  in  explaining  the  initial 
repurchase decision. We believe that this type of cash flow analysis will provide valuable 
insights into why firms choose to repurchase stock for the first time, by reflecting managerial 
decision making relative to operating, investing and financing trade-offs and correspondent 
signals concerning firms’ financial health and strategic performance (regardless of whether 
management deliberately uses financial flows for signaling and conveying information to the 
financial  markets).  In  addition,  we  also  analyze  the  impact  of  these  variables  on  other 
important financial attributes of the firm, such as growth, operating risk and market-to-book. 
Finally, this analysis enables us to study several empirical hypotheses with the potential to 
provide important insights that better explain initial stock repurchases.  
Using a sample of initial stock repurchase firms and a matched-control sample of non-
repurchase firms, we find evidence consistent with the risk reduction signaling (Jagannathan 
et al., 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Lie, 2005) and the dividend substitution (Grullon 
and  Michaely,  2002)  theoretical  hypotheses.  Our  findings  also  support  the  flexibility 
motivation for distributing extraordinary cash flows (especially divesting cash flows) related 
to the dividend substitution theory (Guay and Harford, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). 
We find that the risk reduction signaling hypothesis is significant for initial repurchase firms 
with  the  following  attributes:  larger  size,  non-dividend  payers,  acquirers,  cash  and  debt 
financed and with positive external financing, whereas the dividend substitution hypothesis 
has  consistent  support  in  all  quartiles  of  size  and  sub-samples.  The  other  theoretical 
explanations  and  financial  motivations  for  initial  repurchasing  have,  at  most,  only  mixed 
support. 
The most similar paper to our empirical analysis is a working paper by Evans et al., 
(2001),  which  also  analyze  the  level  and  changes  of  cash  flow  components  of  firms 
conducting stock repurchases, using similar quantitative methodologies. However, it differs in 
several points. First, we only analyze initial stock repurchases. Second, Evans et al., (2001)  
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use only five financial cash flow concepts (free cash flow, net operating flow, net investment 
flows, net working capital flows and net financing flows). We do not use the net working 
capital  flows  related  to  operating  decisions  because  we  want  to  explore  more  strategic 
decisions, such as acquisitions, divestitures and capital expenditures. Further, we use all other 
cash flow concepts and decompose a little farther the net investment cash flows and the net 
financing cash flows and also explore the impact of dividends on stock repurchases and vice-
versa.  Finally,  we  analyze  initial  stock  repurchase  firms  in  isolation  and  compared  to 
contemporaneous  industry  and  size  matched  sample of firms that never repurchased their 
stock before.  
The goal of this study is to contribute to and expand upon previous empirical studies. 
First, this is the first study that attempts to explain the capital and cash flow attributes of 
initial repurchase firms. Even for overall stock repurchases, there are only a few studies we 
are aware of, that attempt to explain these attributes and our investigation is more complete. 
Further, while considerable attention has been devoted in the financial literature to related 
subjects,  such  as  stock  repurchases  versus  (extra  and  regular)  dividend  payments,  little 
consideration has been given to both the financing of stock repurchase decisions and the 
relation  between  stock  repurchases  and  other  mechanisms  of  cash  flow  distribution. 
Therefore, while we agree that market, stockholder and institutional factors may have strong 
influence in the initial repurchase decision, we hope that the focus of our study on other 
fundamental determinant of this decision, the capital and cash flow sources and uses of firms, 
may be considered as an important contribution to the literature. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the 
relevant literature. We present our hypotheses and empirical predictions in section 3. Section 
4  provides  information  about  data,  sample  selection  and  methodology  used.  Section  5 
presents and discusses the empirical results and section 6 provides the conclusions. 
 
 
2. Review of Related Literature 
 
Financial  theory  and  empirical  literature  offer  little  guidance  on  initial  stock 
repurchase events, in contrast to with related topics, such as dividend initiations and stock 
repurchases in general. In chapters 2 and 3, we discuss the determinants and timing of this 
type of financial transaction, with an extended literature review of stock repurchases. Dittmar 
(2000) also presents an excellent literature review of stock repurchases. Here, the focus is on  
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the financial literature about both financing and capital uses related to specific transactions, 
such as investments, acquisitions and, in particular, (extra or regular) cash dividends and 
stock repurchases (never specifically on initial repurchases).  
Although  they  are  strongly  related  and  sometimes  very  hard  to  isolate  (stock 
repurchases are a perfect example), most articles study each dimension (financing and uses) in 
isolation, rarely together. For instance, there is a huge flow of literature on the factors that 
drive the composition of payout decisions, in particular the choice between cash dividends 
(levels  and  increases)  and  stock  repurchases  (e.g.,  Jagannathan  et  al.,  2000;  Guay  and 
Harford, 2000; Fama and French, 2001; Grullon and Michaely, 2002 and 2004). In spite of 
some disagreement in relation to the substitution effect between these two payout devices1, 
some papers conclude that dividend increasers have different financial characteristics than 
stock repurchase firms, in terms of size (e.g., Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2002; 
Alan and Michaely, 2002), operating and permanent cash flows (e.g., Stephens and Weisbach, 
1998;  Fenn  and  Liang,  2001;  Grullon  and  Michaely,  2002),  operating  volatility  (e.g., 
Jagannathan et al., 2000; Lie, 2005), market-to-book ratios (e.g., Fama and French, 2001), ex-
post profitability (e.g., Jagannathan et al., 2000; Guay and Harford, 2000), among others. 
Some papers find specific attributes for stock repurchase firms in relation to regular dividend 
payers (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Lie, 2005) and/or extra-dividend payers (e.g., Howe 
et al., 1992; Lie 2000 and 2005), and only stock repurchases (e.g., Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; 
Kahle, 2002; Jagannathan-Stephens, 2003; Grullon and Michaely, 2004). Summarizing, most 
of these studies conclude that stock repurchase firms have higher operating risk and higher 
transitory cash flows than regular dividend payers, while extra-dividend payers lie somewhere 
in between the other two types of firms. They also offer mixed support for both the free cash 
flow and signaling theoretical hypotheses but they all agree that the underlying flexibility is a 
strong motivation for stock repurchases. 
However, as discussed by Cai (2005), it is only by simultaneously examining payout 
decisions and other cash flows uses (such as acquisitions and investments in new ventures) 
that one can have a more complete and sharper view of the theories offered to explain the 
cash distribution behavior of firms. Also, Brav et al., (2005) find that decision makers view 
payout choices as an important component of overall cash flow uses. Related to this view, an 
early  study  by  Bagwell  and  Shoven  (1988)  examines  the  role  of  acquisitions  and  stock 
                                                            
1 Grullon and Michaely (2002) argue that larger firms do not cut dividends but replace dividend increases with 
stock repurchases. In contrast, Fama and French (2001) posit that the lower propensity to pay dividends is 
motivated by a changing population of publicly traded firms and that stock repurchase firms continue to pay 
dividends, while others have attributes of non-dividend paying firms.  
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repurchases as mechanisms of distributing cash flow (own firm or other firm’s purchase of 
stock) and find that both transactions may be related to free cash flow considerations (stock 
repurchases mitigate agency costs, while acquisitions may increase them). More recently, Cai 
(2005) argues that repurchase firms and acquisition firms belong to different phases of the life 
cycle.  He  suggests  a  pecking  order  of  uses  and  points  out  that,  after  exhausting  internal 
investment opportunities, some firms are still in a mode of outside expansion (acquiring other 
firms), while others start to distribute cash to stockholders in the form of stock repurchases 
and/or dividends, because they may be in a later phase of the life cycle. These latter firms may 
choose not to pursue acquisitions because they are usually value destroying (Harford, 1999; 
Opler et al., 1999). In support of this, Brav et al., (2005) also report that stock repurchase 
decisions  are  of  secondary  importance  in  relation  to  both  capital  expenditures  and 
acquisitions. Other empirical works discuss the relation between acquisitions and dividends. 
For instance, Denis et al., (1994) and Yoon and Starks (1995) find that capital expenditures 
increase following dividend increases.2 Finally, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) argue that 
adverse selection in the “pecking-order” works in the opposite direction when the firm has 
financial  slack  and  seeks  to  distribute  cash  to  stockholders.  When  management  is  more 
confident about the future prospects of the firm, they prefer to repurchase stock rather than to 
reduce debt because they perceive their firm’s stock as undervalued. 
On another front, there has been very little effort made to explain the financing side of 
stock repurchases, as researchers may argue that they are, in fact, a mechanism of making 
financing decisions in order to increase leverage (this would not occur only if and only if the 
stock repurchase transaction is financed solely by … a stock issue).3 Lie (2005) is a notable 
exception. Lie (2005) finds that firms that use debt to finance the repurchase have lower 
volatility of operating income than firms that use cash (which he labels as cash-rich firms) 
and concludes that debt-financed repurchases are similar to dividend increases in that both are 
undertaken by firms with low operating risk, probably because both events effectively commit 
future cash flows to be distributed to stockholders. Two other papers, by Barth and Kasznick 
(1999) and Evans et al., (2001), also study cash flow formation prior to and following stock 
repurchase  transactions.  Barth  and  Kasznick  (1999)  study  the  relation  between  stock 
repurchases  and  intangible  assets  and  show  that  the  market  reactions  to stock repurchase 
                                                            
2 Other studies show that stock repurchases may be used as a mechanism to prevent takeovers (Schleifer, 1986; 
Bagwell, 1991; and Persons, 1994). 
3 We include the studies on the impact of the type of cash flow (operating or permanent versus extraordinary and 
transitory) available to firms that distribute them to stockholders (such as Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Guay  
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announcements are negative when stock repurchase firms have excess cash and lack attractive 
investment alternatives. They demonstrate that by constructing three proxies for “idle cash” 
using the concepts of operating, investing and financing cash flows. Evans et al., (2001) is the 
closest paper to ours. It analyzes the level of and changes in cash flow components of firms 
conducting stock repurchases, using similar quantitative methodologies. They conclude that, 
subsequent  to  repurchases,  net  working  capital,  net  operating  flow  and  external  finance 
reliance  decrease,  while  net  investing  flow  actually  increases.  They  conclude  that  their 
findings support free cash flow as a primary driver for repurchasing stock. Finally, Billet and 
Xue (2004) study stock repurchase firms financed with external equity, to show that these 
firms are special, as they have better investment opportunities, less internal cash flow and face 
severe financial constraints. The spirit of this article is close to ours but its focus is only on 
the external equity financing and the signaling role of stock repurchase announcements by 
firms that rely on external equity. 
Of course, there have been some papers which analyze the financing of other cash 
flow uses. For instance, Harford (1999) shows that cash rich firms are more likely to conduct 
acquisitions  (although  these  transactions  are  usually  value-decreasing,  as  evidenced  by 
negative  stock  returns).  Elsas  et  al.,  (2006)  analyze  the  financing  decisions  for  “major 
investments” (they label them as “major” when the investment exceeds 200% of the firm’s 
past three year average investment level) and find that those major investments are mostly 
externally financed, with debt playing the dominant role. However, they show that internal 
financing increases over time, thus reversing the initial effect of debt finance. They also find 




3. Hypotheses Development and Empirical Predictions 
 
3.1. Hypotheses and Predictions to the Complete Sample of Initial Repurchase Firms 
 
Some financial literature (Jagannathan et al., 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Lie, 
2005, among others) predict that stock repurchase firms tend to be moderate-to-large, mature 
firms, with low leverage and growth potential, large cash reserves, higher profits and with 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and Harford, 2000; and Jagannathan et al., 2000) as literature related to payout decisions, instead of related to 
the financing side of stock repurchases.  
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higher non-operating cash flows. To test whether these findings apply to initial repurchases, 
we predict that firms are more likely to conduct initial repurchases if managers believe that 
their firms have enough financial strength due to the following: (i) the current stock of cash is 
relatively  high,  (ii)  the  current  debt  ratio  is  relatively  low,  although  (iii)  the  operating 
volatility is relatively large, (iv) there were recent large transitory inflows, and (v) future 
growth  will  not  be  very  high.  The  underlying  arguments  related  to  these  predictions,  in 
particular, excess cash and low leverage ratios and growth, highlight the free cash flow and 
maturity hypotheses.  
Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan et al., (2000) argue that dividend increases 
will be observed following permanent improvements in operating cash flows, while stock 
repurchases will be used to distribute more transitory and non-operating cash flows in order to 
avoid over-investment problems. Therefore, we test a second, related hypothesis: we predict 
that initial stock repurchases will be positively related to extraordinary cash flows, such as 
extraordinary items and divestitures. 
However,  the  operating  signaling  hypothesis  is  also  plausible  as  an  alternative 
explanation of initial stock repurchases. For instance, Nohel and Tarhan (1998) argue that 
management  use  stock  repurchases  to  signal  confidence  in  improved  future  operating 
performance,  either  operating  cash  flow  increases  or  operating  risk  decreases.  However, 
alternatively, the cash or debt employed in financing stock repurchases may result in less cash 
or  less  debt  available  to  invest  in  capital  expenditures  and  acquisitions.  Thus,  another 
interpretation of the initial repurchase as a signal is that the firms lack attractive investment 
opportunities (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2004). In order to test this theoretical explanation 
of stock repurchases, we will analyze whether increases over time in both market-to-book and 
operating cash flows occur in the overall sample of initial repurchases.  
In addition to these predictions related to the full sample, we test other hypotheses 
related to the sub-samples in the sections that follow. In particular, we will check for the 
dividend characteristics of several sub-samples of firms, as we believe that this is a privileged 




3.2. Hypotheses and Predictions to the Samples of Dividend Payers and Non-Dividend 
Payers 
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The studies on dividend increases (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 1988; Benartzi et al., 1997; 
Grullon,  et al., 2002), cash dividends initiations (e.g., Bulan et al., 2006; Kale et al., 2006) 
and  special  versus  regular  dividend  increases  (e.g.,  Brickley,  1983;  Lie,  2000)  show  that 
dividend payments convey more positive information when they are more “sticky” payments 
(Lintner, 1956; Fama and Babiak, 1968; Asquith and Mullins, 1983). In the same spirit, like 
extra dividends, stock repurchases are also one-time cash disbursements. This leads to the 
following prediction: initial stock repurchases conducted by dividend payers are not related to 
signaling  operating  performance  improvements,  but  rather  to  free  cash  flow  or  maturity 
considerations. This prediction may not be valid for non-dividend payers.  
In addition, we test the dividends substitution hypothesis by analyzing whether initial 
repurchase firms that are also dividend payers will have the same or different changes in 
dividends and total payouts, relative to their matched counterparts. 
 
 
3.3.  Hypotheses  and  Predictions  to  the  Samples  of  Acquisition  and  Non-Acquisition 
Firms 
 
As discussed before, acquisitions and stock repurchases are concurrent uses, which are 
on the opposite side of Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis (Bagwell and Shoven, 1988; Cai, 
2005). We will check if either of these two sub-samples (ex-ante, all firms are non-repurchase 
firms) have different (ex-ante and ex-post) characteristics which may explain why they choose 
to repurchase stock for the first time and have different behaviors in terms of acquisitions.  
Denis et al., (1994) and Yoon and Starks (1995) find that capital expenditures increase 
following  dividend  increases.  We  predict  that  this  may  also  occur  following  initial  stock 
repurchases meaning that these transactions would not be related to the avoidance of free cash 
flow  problems  and  managerial  overinvestment.  On  the  contrary,  increased  acquisition 
spending is plausibly a more accurate manifestation of free cash flow agency problems. 
Finally, the choice between stock repurchases and acquisitions involves managerial 
discretion, while capital expenditures and other cash spending can be “sticky” (Brav et al., 
2005). Thus, we can check if data reflects a priority structure in terms of capital uses between 
stock repurchases and acquisitions. Cai (2005) argues that there is a pecking order of capital 
uses because stock repurchase firms belong to a later phase of the firm life cycle, in relation to 
firms that engage in acquisitions. If this is true, then initial repurchase firms should decrease 
their  acquisitions  spending,  while  the  non-acquisitions  sample  of  initial  repurchase  firms  
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should maintain their track record of no acquisitions. In addition, they should present more 




3.4.  Hypotheses  and  Predictions  for  Firms  with  Negative  and  Positive  External 
Financing 
 
Firms with negative reliance on external financing may conduct initial repurchases 
with different motivations and in response to different theoretical determinants relative to 
those which rely on both internal and external financing. Therefore, we predict that the former 
have maturity attributes (especially, low growth), may suffer from free cash flow problems 
(avoiding the so-called “market discipline”) or aim to signal operating risk reduction, while 
this may not be valid for the latter firms.  
 
 
3.5.  Hypotheses  and  Predictions  for  Cash  and  Debt  Financing  of  Initial  Stock 
Repurchases 
 
Large cash reserves are a valuable source to finance stock repurchases. However, these 
cash accumulations may generate agency problems as firms increase their ability to spend 
large sums while removing the discipline of the external financial market from their capital 
allocation decisions. Therefore, the behavior of firms in accumulating large amounts of cash 
is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis related to potential over-investment decisions. 
In view of this, we predict that the flexibility and independence that the cash reserves provide 
to firms may induce stock repurchases to mitigate these potential free cash flow agency costs. 
One may argue that cash accumulation or, alternatively, having particularly low debt ratios, 
have a similar impact on firm value because they both provide flexibility to firms in order to 
pursue expansion and acquisitions. But while the accumulation of cash reserves reduces a 
firm’s reliance on external financing, low leverage ratios only increase the debt capacity of 
the  firm,  thus  increasing  the  likelihood  of  new  external  financing.  We  expect  that  stock 
                                                            
4 As a robustness check, we will also compare two non-matched sub-samples of acquisition firms: one with 
initial  repurchase  firms  and  another  with  non-repurchase  firms.  In  this  way  we  check  whether the maturity 
hypothesis or Cai’s pecking order will prevail for initial repurchase firms.  
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repurchases financed by debt have more ambiguous financial motivations (than those that 
imply  only  a  decrease  in  cash  balances),  which  may  be  explained  by  the  performance 
signaling hypothesis, as additional debt is a stronger commitment to future payments (Grullon 
and  Michaely,  2002),  risk  reduction  signaling  (Lie,  2005)  or  the  dividends  substitution 
hypothesis  (Lie,  2005).  To  summarize,  we  aim  to  test  whether  initial  stock  repurchases 
financed by cash are consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis, and whether the initial 
repurchases  financed  by  debt  or  any  other  financing  arrangements  (both  debt  and  cash, 




3.6.  Hypotheses  and  Predictions  for  Samples  with  Significant  and  Non-Significant 
Divestitures 
 
Financial literature usually claims that firms that have experienced a non-recurring 
accumulation of cash, for example due to divestitures or asset sales, should distribute this 
excess  cash  through  stock  repurchases  rather  than  through  an  increase  in  cash  dividends 
(since  this  latter  would  commit  the  firm  to  pay  higher  future  dividends,  whereas  stock 
repurchases are generally stand-alone actions or one-time cash disbursements). All else equal, 
divesting  activity  may  be  considered  an  exogenous  and  transitory  increase  in  the  capital 
available to several uses, that should be more likely to be distributed by repurchasing stock. In 
contrast, firms that divest could be giving a signal of approaching maturity and the absence of 
growth opportunities. In addition, these firms may be reversing previous “empire building” 
activities,  in  order  to  mitigate  free  cash  flow  problems.  We  expect  to  find  the  former 
statement, rather than the two latter ones. This leads to our following prediction for initial 
stock repurchase firms that conduct significant divestments: the combination of divestments 
and stock repurchases is only an integrated signal that the firm is conducting a reorganization 
(thus focusing its activity only in some core businesses). Therefore, we expect that initial 
stock repurchase firms which engage in divestments are neither approaching maturity, nor 
suffer from free cash flow problems. 
 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
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4. 1. Sample Selection and Data Collection 
 
In this study, we analyze the capital and cash flow sources and uses of initial stock 
repurchase  firms  and  empirically  examine  the  extent  to  which  firms  formulate  their 
repurchase decision according to some theoretical hypotheses. The data for this study came 
from Compustat database for the period 1975 through 2004, inclusive. We focus on actual 
stock repurchases and track a sample of 630 firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
which went public after 1975, and that initiated stock repurchases in the period of 1980-2002 
(henceforth, initial repurchase firms or “initial repurchasers”). An initial repurchase is defined 
as the first repurchase that a firm makes since its IPO. We will assume that the IPO year is the 
first year in which the firm had a positive stock price on Compustat (as Baker and Wurgler, 
2002; Lemmon  and  Zender,  2003  and  Bulan  et  al.,  2006).  We  use  the  measure  of  stock 
repurchases that Allen and Michaely (2002) and Banyi et al., (2005) consider as the most 
accurate (or least biased) measure of  the actual dollar amount spent on repurchases that they 
name as Compustat purchases of common and preferred stock adjusted for the change in 
preferred stock.5 We follow previous literature when we further restrict the sample to initial 
repurchases  that  represent  more  than  one  million  US  dollars.  Also,  in  line  with  previous 
studies, we truncate all variables at the top and bottom one percentiles and we exclude those 
firms for which several relevant variables from our analysis are missing. We further excluded 




4. 2. Variables 
 
To study the sources and uses of capital and cash flow of initial stock repurchase 
firms, we will use a set of variables related to the financial strength of a firm, which includes 
several concepts and measures of cash flow (operating, free, extraordinary, investment and 
financing flows) and their main components (e.g., we divide external financing into external 
                                                            
5  The  Compustat  data  item  overstates  open  market  repurchases  of  common stock for a number of reasons 
(Stephens-Weisbach, 1998; Jagannathan et al 2000). First, it includes repurchases of preferred stock. Second, it 
includes a variety of other transactions such as the conversion of other classes of stock into common stock. In 
some cases Compustat data item #115 corresponds to repurchases net of equity issuance, which Compustat 
indicates with a combined figure code. Therefore, we identify stock repurchases as the amount of purchase of 
common  and  preferred  stock  (Compustat  data  item  #115)  minus  any  reduction  in  the  value  (retirement,  
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equity and change in debt and we divide the investing cash flow into capital expenditures, 
acquisitions and divestments), and also capital stocks (as equity, debt and cash). We use other 
key measures of interest, such as market-to-book, growth opportunities and operating risk, all 
of which can affect a firm’ financial health. 
We examine ex-ante and ex-post differences and also changes in firms’ attributes over 
the period in which initial repurchases take place. We use three-year averages for all variables 
(unless otherwise noted) as in Jagannathan et al (2000), both because it is possible that firms 
may initiate stock repurchases in response to cumulative performance, liquidity and risk from 
the previous years and also in order to reduce noise induced by year-to-year variations in 
many of the variables. That is, average values for years –3 through –1 relative to the initial 
repurchase year are used for variables prior to the initial repurchase year and average values 
for  years  0  through  +2  relative  to  the  initial  repurchase  year  are  used  for  the  variables 
subsequent to the repurchase initiation. In this context, the sample for our analysis is limited 
to the period from 1980 to 2002 to allow for measurement of prior and subsequent variables.  
The absolute values of all variables are scaled by total assets (#6), unless otherwise 
stated, to control for scale effects and mitigate heteroskedasticity. Table 1 presents a synthesis 





Our main goal is to study initial stock repurchases using a more developed set of 
capital and cash flow variables than previous studies related to other financial transactions. 
We  identified  operating  cash  flow,  extraordinary  cash  flows  (extraordinary  items  and 
divestitures), change in debt and change in external equity as financing sources and capital 
expenditures, acquisitions, dividends and stock repurchases and changes in dividends as uses. 
We track net changes in these variables in periods surrounding the initial repurchase event. As 
we are interested in the potentially unique role of initial repurchases, we use the matched-
pairs methodology in order to understand the real specificity of these transactions. We achieve 
this by using a cross-section of initial repurchase firms matched to a control sample that 
includes non-repurchase firms. Each initial repurchase firm-year observation is paired with a 
non-repurchase firm-year observation that is closest in terms of size (measured by total assets, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
conversion, and/or redemption of preferred stock, Compustat items #56 and #130) of the net number of preferred 
stocks outstanding.  
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within an interval of +/-25%) and within the same industry grouping (assuming the 4-digit 
SIC code as primary matching and 2-digit SIC code for the remaining cases). This analysis 
provides  us  with  the  possibility  of  testing  several  empirical  hypotheses  and  theoretical 
explanations by using statistical procedures, such as differences in means or medians testing, 
and logistic regressions.6 
We have constructed our sub-samples according to the hypotheses we aim to test. 
First,  we  consider  one  firm  as  belonging  to  the  non-dividend  sub-sample  and  the  non-
acquisition sub-sample, if the firm does not pay any cash dividend or engage in acquisitions, 
respectively, in the three years preceding the initial repurchase year. Analogously, we include 
one firm in the negative external financing sub-sample if that firm has a negative value for the 
external financing variable (change in debt plus change in external equity). In addition, we 
consider  that  a  initial  stock  repurchase  is  financed  by  cash  if  two  situations  occur 
simultaneously:  the  cash  balance  value  decreases  and  the  debt  ratio  also  decreases.  We 
include an initial stock repurchase in the debt financed sub-sample if, again, two situations 
occur simultaneously: the debt ratio also increases and the cash balance value also increases. 
All other situations are included in the sample of non-debt or cash financed repurchases. 
Finally, we construct two sub-samples for testing the impact of significant divestitures on the 
theoretical labeling of (initial) stock repurchases. We include an initial repurchase firm in the 
significant divesting firms if that firm has a value for the divesting cash flow variable higher 





5.1. Results From the Complete Sample of Initial Repurchase Firms 
 
Tables 2A to 2C and panel 1 of table 4 show the results of our univariate analysis and 
logistic regressions, respectively, related to our full sample of initial repurchase firms and 
their matched non-repurchase counterparts. In short, our evidence offers empirical support for 
some of our hypotheses reported in section 3.1. In particular, initial repurchase firms have 
                                                            
6 As a robustness check, we used three alternative logistic models, one without any changes in the variables, the 
other with only cash, leverage and operating cash flow changes and the last one with most variable changes (the 
one displayed in tables 4). Again, the results were very similar.  
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significantly higher cash balances and operating cash flows, lower leverage and operating 
volatility, and no significant differences in terms of growth (confirmed by the absence of 
significant differences in capital expenditures, acquisitions and total investing cash flows).  
These findings support the overall hypothesis that initial repurchase firms have greater 
financial strength than their matched non-repurchase firms. Initial repurchase firms also have 
higher transitory cash flows that come from divestitures, as predicted. Our findings support 
the  risk  reduction  signaling  hypothesis  for  repurchases  of  Grullon  and  Michaely  (2004), 
because the coefficient of changes in operating risk has a significant negative value. Two 
predictions related to the dividend substitution hypothesis are also supported. First, consistent 
with  the  flexibility  motivation  for  repurchasing  (Guay  and  Harford,  2000;  Grullon  and 
Michaely, 2002, among others), we find that initial repurchases seem to be used to distribute 
non-operating cash flows that are not likely to be sustainable in the long term, as is the case of 
divesting cash flows. Further, the coefficients of changes in dividends (CHDIV) and changes 
in CHDIV variables in table 4 panel 1 are negative and significant, while the coefficients of 
total payouts (DIVREP) and changes in DIVREP are positive and significant. These results 
suggest that initial repurchases are followed by changes in the magnitude and composition of 
total payouts, in which dividend increases are substituted by stock repurchases. The fact that 
the  differences  relative  to the  matched  samples  in the variables that represent the payout 
policy are significant only ex-post, indicate that initial repurchases may configure the start of 
a relevant change in the composition of payout policy in favor of a higher proportion of stock 
repurchases in total payouts. 
The other hypotheses tested have, at most, only mixed support. Although table 2A 
shows that initial repurchase firms have higher median cash balances than non-repurchase 
firms and table 2C reports a significant decrease in cash balances (both in absolute terms and 
in relation to non-repurchase firms), table 4 panel 1 shows that cash and changes in cash do 
not  increase  the  initial  repurchase  likelihood.  Their  coefficients  are  actually  negative  and 
significant. Further, there are no significant differences in terms of growth. Thus, although 
initial repurchase firms have higher operating cash flows both prior to and subsequent to 
initial repurchases, the free cash flow hypothesis and the excess cash distribution motivation 
for repurchases are not supported. The same conclusion applies to the operating performance 
signaling and maturity hypotheses. First, the operating signaling hypothesis is not supported 
as both changes in market-to-book and in operating cash flows are negatively related to initial 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7  As  a  robustness  check,  we  tried  other  than  5%  cutting  points,  as  3%  and  2%,  but  both  the  number  of 
observations in each sub-sample and the results, remained the same.  
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repurchase  likelihood.  Further,  most  financial  attributes  of  approaching  maturity  do  not 
increase  initial  repurchase  likelihood  (with  the  exception  of  decreases  in  operating  risk). 
Finally, initial repurchase firms have lower debt ratios but the negative sign of change in 
leverage in table 4 panel 1 does not allow us to reach a conclusion about the relevance of the 
increasing leverage motivation for initial stock repurchases.  
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5.2. Results From the Sample of Dividend and Non-Dividend Payers 
 
Tables 3 (panels 1 and 2) and 4 (panel 2) show the results of our univariate analysis 
and logistic regressions, respectively, for the sub-samples of initial repurchase firms that are 
dividend  and  non-dividend  payers,  and  their  matched  non-repurchase  firms.  The  main 
differences  between  the  two  sub-samples  are  the  following:  dividend  payers  have  lower 
operating risk, cash balances, acquisitions spending and divesting cash flows, higher capital 
expenditures and present decreases in total investing cash flows. Also, the dividend payers 
sub-sample is one of the few that does not present decreases ex-post in market-to-book ratios. 
Both sub-samples present decreases in cash but in neither do we find significant increases in 
debt  ratios  (although  they  have  prior  lower  debt  ratios  relative  to  their  matched  non-
repurchase firms).  
The  logistic  regressions  presented  in  table-panel  2  have  other  interesting  results. 
Dividend payers conduct initial repurchases in response not only to their lower operating risk 
and leverage but also to higher extraordinary items. Non-dividend payers also conduct initial 
repurchases for their lower operating risk and leverage (and future changes in those variables) 
and in response to extra cash flow related to divestitures.  
These results seem to slightly support the risk reduction signaling hypothesis (due to the 
significant negative relation of changes in operating risk and initial repurchase likelihood) and 
the  free  cash  flow  hypothesis  (especially  for  having  higher  operating  cash  flows  and 
disgorging excess cash balances) for non-dividend payers and the maturity hypothesis for 
dividend payers (mainly due to decreases in the three categories of investing cash flows and in 
the total external financing). Furthermore, we document evidence supporting the flexibility 
motivation  for  both  sub-samples  and  distributing  excess  cash  for  the  sub-sample  of  non-
dividend payers. Finally, there are some differences in terms of future cash flow distributions. 
As in most sub-samples, the increases in total payouts and decreases in changes in dividends 
are  significant.  In  addition,  we  find  that  non-dividend  payers  do  not  increase  changes  in 
dividends  in  the  future,  while  dividend  payers  increase  total  payouts  only  slightly.  These 
findings  support  the  Fama  and  French  (2001)  contention  that  repurchase  firms  that  are 
dividend payers are different from non-dividend payers because the latter firms maintain their 
policy of not paying dividends while the former may conduct repurchases for distributing 
extraordinary cash flows but also pay dividends. However, it also seems that dividend payers  
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may sometimes substitute dividend increases for stock repurchases (Grullon and Michaely, 
2002). 
 
5.3. Results From the Sample of Acquisition and Non-Acquisition Firms 
 
When comparing the two sub-samples of firms, considering the matched-samples on 
tables 3 (panels 3 and 4) and 4 (panel 3), we find that the acquisition firms have higher 
leverage and lower operating risk, (internal) growth and cash balances than the sample of non-
acquisition  firms.  Furthermore,  in  contrast  to  non-acquisition  firms,  their  market-to-book 
ratios, (internal) growth and cash balances decrease. In terms of other cash flow statement 
items  (of  course,  not  including  acquisitions),  we  document  that  the  non-acquisitions sub-
sample  of  firms  has  significantly  higher  divesting  cash  flows  and  relies  less  on  external 
financing (both leverage and equity). We consider this to be evidence that acquisitions are 
financed by external financing (in addition to cash balances). Interestingly, the sub-sample of 
non-acquisition firms that are also initial repurchase firms is the only one for which the debt 
ratios are higher for initial repurchase firms than their matched counterparts (both ex-ante and 
ex-post).  The  same  holds  true  for  the  sub-sample  of  acquisition  firms  in  terms  of  non-
significant changes in cash balances, which is not a common result. 
However, in spite of being interesting, the results reported below do not help us much 
in explaining why a firm conducts an initial repurchase. There is no clear support of any 
theoretical hypothesis and most of the differences in financial attributes of these two sub-
samples seem to be related to whether they do or do not conduct acquisitions (e.g., lower 
internal growth, lower external financing). Furthermore, we do not find that there is a pecking 
order of financial applications (Cai, 2005; Brav et al., 2005), in which repurchase firms are in 
a latter phase of the firm life cycle in relation to acquisition firms. On one hand, we note that 
the acquisition spending of initial repurchase firms that also conduct acquisitions decreases 
after the initial repurchase event. However, on the other hand, it is also true that acquisitions 
spending increases for the sub-sample of non-acquisition firms. Thus, it is plausible that non-
acquisition  firms  will  turn  into  acquisition  firms  after  the  initial  repurchase.  In  addition, 
acquisition firms do not have attributes of more mature firms (in spite of their lower operating 
risk and lower internal growth), since they have higher total investing cash flows, lower cash 
balances and operating cash flows. In addition, we do not have evidence consistent with the 
statement  that  capital  expenditures  increase  following  initial  repurchases  (as  found  for  
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dividend increasers by Denis et al., 1994 and Yon and Starks, 1995).8 Finally, we note that, 
for the sub-sample of acquisition firms, the differences relative to the matched samples in the 
payout  variables  are  only  significant  ex-post,  which  indicates  that  the  initial  repurchase 
transaction marks an important change in the payout policy specially for these firms. 
 
 
5.4. Results From the Samples of Firms with Negative and Positive External Financing 
 
Our results are reported in tables 3 (panels 5 and 6) and 4 (panel 4). We find that 
initial repurchase firms with negative reliance on external financing present lower growth, 
operating  risk  and  debt  ratios  and  higher  operating  cash  flows  than  their  matched 
counterparts. However, the most striking result is that this sub-sample of initial repurchase 
firms is the only one to present the same market-to-book ratio as their control firms and a 
positive change in this ratio ex-post. This evidence seems to suggest that these firms use 
initial repurchases to signal their perceived undervaluation. As predicted, they have some 
attributes suggesting that they are in the maturity phase of their life cycle or that they face free 
cash flow problems (lower operating risk, growth and higher operating cash flows), while 
other  variables  suggest  the  opposite  (relatively  low  cash  balances  and  increases  in  total 
investing  cash  flows).  The  sub-sample  of  initial  repurchase  firms  with  positive  external 
financing  has  some  similar  attributes  to  the  other  sub-sample  but  has  much  higher  cash 
balances  (that  decrease  ex-post)  and  divesting  cash  flows  (that  even  increase  ex-post). 
Therefore,  they  seem  to  be  distributing  excess  cash  and  transitory  cash  flows  to  avoid 
incurring free cash flow agency costs. Finally, as in previous sections, in both samples the 
amount  of  change  in  dividends  decreases  over  time,  while  the  total  payout  increases 
substantially. This means that initial repurchases are followed by changes in the magnitude 
and  composition  of  total  payouts,  in  which  dividend  increases  are  substituted  by  stock 




                                                            
8 As a robustness check, we compared two non-matched sub-sample of acquisition firms (a non-matched-pairs 
analysis): one with initial repurchase firms and the other with non-repurchase firms. In this way we checked 
whether the maturity hypothesis or the Cai’s pecking order would prevail for initial repurchase firms. However, 
with the exception of higher leverage and lower (internal) growth, also presented in the initial repurchase sub-
samples, there were no significant differences between the matched sample of non-repurchase firms (presented in 
table 3-panel 4) and the non-repurchase firms which are also acquisition firms.  
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5.5. Results From the Samples of Cash and Debt Financing of Initial Repurchases 
 
Our results show that cash and debt financed transactions present different attributes 
that  suggest  different  economic  motivations  and  theoretical  explanations  underlying  the 
decision to conduct initial repurchases (see table 3 - panels 7 and 8 - and table 4 - panel 5). 
Firstly, the debt financed firms present the same market-to-book as their matched-pairs, which 
even increases (although not significantly) ex-post. This may indicate that the increase in 
leverage and the stock repurchase decision may signal undervaluation, operating performance 
improvements (such as operating cash flow increases, although again not significantly), or 
both. This evidence is consistent with Grullon and Michaely (2002), who state that debt is a 
stronger commitment to the future and thus a stronger signal to markets. In contrast, the sub-
sample of cash financed firms does not present any of these results. These latter firms present 
a stronger than expected decrease in leverage (more than 50% of the initial value, which is 
much  more  than  anticipated  due  to  the  fact  that  we  impose  a  decrease  in  leverage  to 
categorize the sub-samples) and in cash balances (again, more than 60% of the initial value). 
However, we do not relate these findings to the free cash flow or maturity hypotheses, as this 
sub-sample presents higher values for the external equity financing variable and only small 
decreases in acquisitions and total investing cash flows. The non-debt or cash financed initial 
repurchases present attributes more closely related to those of the cash financed sub-sample, 
rather than the debt financed sub-sample. In addition, the data suggest that divesting cash 
flows, and thus the flexibility motivation, may have a role in explaining initial repurchases for 
this sub-sample. Finally, as before, we find that changes in dividends decrease and the total 
payouts increase over time for all sub-samples. For both cash and debt financed repurchases, 
the differences between the figures for these two variables relative to the matched samples are 
significant only ex-post. This indicates that initial repurchases in those cases may configure 
the  start  of  a  relevant  change  in  the  composition  of  payout  policy  in  favor  of  a  higher 
proportion of stock repurchases to total payouts. 
 
 
5.6. Results From the Samples with Significant and Non-Significant Divestitures 
 
We  find  evidence  that  initial  repurchase  firms  that  also  conduct  significant 
divestments (higher than 5% of total book assets) are doing so as a part of a reorganization 
process (see tables 3 - panels 10 and 11 - and 4 – panel 6). Neither the maturity, free cash  
- 22 - 
flow or any other hypothesis help us to explain these transactions. Our conclusion is due to 
the following significant results. Firstly, the firms in this sub-sample do not present lower 
growth and operating risk than their matched-pairs (in contrast to the sub-sample of non-
significant divesting firms). In addition, over time, there is no significant increase in the debt 
ratio nor a significant decrease in cash balances. Also, we note that the divesting activity is 
contemporaneous with higher capital expenditures, so that these firms still have higher total 
investing cash flows than initial repurchase firms included in the non-significant divesting 
sub-sample, both ex-ante and ex-post. Furthermore, the sub-sample of significant divesting 
firms  is  one  of the few initial repurchase sub-samples that does not present a significant 
decrease in market-to-book, which may suggest that reorganizations do not have a negative 
impact on stock market prices. Finally, again, the amount of change in dividends decreases 
over  time,  while  total  payouts  increase  substantially.  Thus,  the  substitution  of  dividend 
increases by stock repurchases is once again supported. 
 
 
5.7. Is There a Size Effect? 
 
The matched-pairs design has both the drawback and the benefit of mitigating (at least 
partially) the size effect in our empirical analysis. Therefore, one last test is in order: we are 
now splitting our initial repurchase observations in quartiles of size to analyze whether our 
conclusions apply irrespective of size by using logistic regressions for each quartile.  
We  find  that  some  variables  have  statistical  significance  only  for  low  size 
observations (the negative impact of market-to-book ratios and the positive effect of operating 
cash flows, change in external equity and change in capital expenditures), while others have 
significant  effect  only  in  the  higher  quartiles  (the  negative  impact  of  operating  risk  and 
changes in operating risk). From these results, we conclude that the operating risk reduction 
signaling hypothesis is only supported for larger size initial repurchase firms. In addition, only 
the four variables directly related to payout policy have significant effect for all (or almost all) 
size quartiles: the DIVREP, CHDIVREP, CHDIV and CHCHDIV. The two former variables 
have a positive impact and the latter two a negative effect on initial repurchase likelihood. All 
other variables have either little (or no) impact or contradictory signs. However, no case is 
there to conclude that a specific theoretical hypothesis or financial motivation is specific to a 
particular quartile.  
  




In this study we investigate the capital and cash flow sources and uses of initial stock 
repurchase firms, using univariate analysis and logistic regressions. Overall, our evidence is 
broadly consistent with the risk reduction signaling (Jagannathan et al., 2000; Grullon and 
Michaely,  2004;  Lie,  2005)  and  the  dividend  substitution  (Grullon  and  Michaely,  2002) 
theoretical hypotheses. Our findings are also consistent with the flexibility motivation for 
distributing extraordinary cash flows (especially divesting cash flows) related to the dividend 
substitution theory (Guay and Harford, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). We find that the 
risk  reduction  signaling  hypothesis  is  significant  for  initial  repurchase  firms  with  the 
following attributes: larger size, non-dividend payers, acquirers, cash and debt financed and 
with positive external financing, whereas the dividend substitution hypothesis has consistent 
support in all quartiles of size and sub-samples. In addition, the other theoretical explanations 
and financial motivations for initial repurchasing have, at most, only slight support. We were 
not able to find significant improvement in future operating cash flows relative to matched 
counterparts in any sub-sample of initial repurchase firms used (Lie and McConnell, 1998; 
Grullon  and  Michaely,  2002),  although  initial  repurchase  firms  typically  generate  more 
operating cash flows than their matched counterparts prior to and after the initial repurchase 
event.  One  exception,  may  be  valid  for  smaller  initial  repurchase  firms,  however. 
Furthermore, subsequent to the initial repurchase decision, the external financing variables 
always  decline.  This  reduced  reliance  on  external  financing  combined  with  a  decrease in 
operating cash flows and operating risk suggest initial repurchase firms are reaching maturity, 
but other evidence, like constant growth and increases in total investing cash flows, suggests 
otherwise. Furthermore, in most sub-samples, initial repurchase firms have lower debt ratios. 
However, the negative sign of change in leverage in most logistic regressions does not allow 
us to reach a conclusion on the relevance of increased leverage as a motivation for initial 
stock  repurchases.  Finally,  although  the  median  cash  balances  of  initial  repurchase  firms 
decrease substantially ex-post, most of our evidence indicates that the significance of cash and 
changes  in  cash  in  explaining  initial  repurchase  likelihood  is  surprisingly  low  and  has 
unexpected negative signs. Therefore, the excess cash motivation for initial repurchases is 
also not supported. 
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Table 1: Definition and Measurement of Variables 
List of variables used with definition and Compustat code. Data for firms characteristics are obtained from the 
Compustat database. 
Variables  Definition  Compustat # 
SIZE  Natural log of the book value of assets  ln(#6) 
LEVERAGE  Book value of total debt  (#9+#44)/#6 
CASH  Cash balances   #1/(#6-#1) 
MARKET-TO-BOOK  Equity market-to-book ratio  (#24*#25)/#60 
OPRISK  Operating risk  Stdev(#18/#6) 
GROWTH  Capex advertising and R&D  (#128+#45+#46)/#6 
EXTITEMS  Extraordinary items  (#106+#124+#213+#217+#314)/#6 
OPCF  Operating cash flow  (#110+#308)/#6 
CHDEBT  Change in total debt  (#9+#44)(t/t-1/#6 
CHEXTEQ  Change in external equity  #108 
AFINCF  Adjusted financing cash flow  CHDEBT+CHEXTEQ 
CAPEX  Capital expenditures  (#113+#128+#310)/#6 
ACQUIS  Acquisitions  #129/#6 
DIVEST  Divesting cash flow  (#107+#109+#309)/#6 
INVCF  Investing cash flow  CAPEX+ACQUIS-DIVEST 
TCF  Total cash flow  OPCF+AFINCF 
DIVREP  Dividends and repurchases  [(#21+#115-#56(t/t-1)]/#6 
CHDIV  Change in dividends  #21(t/t-1)/#6 
  
- 28 - 
 
Table 2A: Ex-Ante Descriptive Statistics for Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
Summary descriptive statistics for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0). Ex-ante means 
that  calculations  are  based  on  three-year  averages  preceding  the  initial  repurchase  event  (years  -3  to  -1).  A  t-test  on 
differences in means is performed for ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV. A non-parametric Mann/Whitney ranksum 
test on differences in medians between these two types of firms is conducted for all other variables. The sign *** denotes 
significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for 
variable definitions and text for details. 
Event Firms (R1) 
 
Non-Repurchase Firms (R0)  Variables 
Mean  St. Dev.  Median  Mean  St. Dev.  Median 
Difference 
MARKET-TO-BOOK  3.502  4.421  2.498  3.413  6.268  2.054  *** 
LEVERAGE  0.172  0.179  0.124  0.222  0.238  0.148  *** 
CASH  0.418  0.677  0.166  0.482  1.175  0.124  * 
GROWTH  0.133  0.09  0.115  0.154  0.146  0.120   
OPRISK  0.066  0.108  0.035  0.101  0.220  0.039  ** 
EXTITEMS  0.018  0.091  0.005  0.030  0.108  0.005   
OPCF  0.097  0.102  0.100  0.053  0.158  0.071  *** 
CHDEBT  0.014  0.093  0.000  0.028  0.134  0.004  ** 
CHEXTEQ  0.099  0.132  0.047  0.119  0.175  0.039   
AFINCF  0.113  0.159  0.076  0.147  0.215  0.091  ** 
CAPEX  0.112  0.178  0.073  0.107  0.126  0.076   
ACQUIS  0.037  0.072  0.002  0.034  0.067  0.000   
DIVESTCF  0.034  0.151  0.001  0.020  0.054  0.001  ** 
INVCF  0.115  0.121  0.096  0.122  0.124  0.098   
TCF  0.210  0.152  0.189  0.200  0.161  0.175  * 
DIVREP  0.018  0.070  0.001  0.015  0.045  0.000   
CHDIV  0.006  0.025  0.000  0.006  0.023  0.000   
 
 
Table 2B: Ex-Post Descriptive Statistics for Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
Summary descriptive statistics for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0). Ex-
post means that calculations are based on three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 0 
to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV. A non-
parametric Mann/Whitney ranksum test on differences in medians between these two types of firms is conducted 
for all other variables. The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * 
denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
Event Firms (R1) 
 
No Repurchases Firms (R0)  Variables 
Mean  St. Dev.  Median  Mean  St. Dev.  Median 
Difference 
MARKET-TO-BOOK  2.749  2.358  2.137  2.750  3.639  1.890  *** 
LEVERAGE  0.181  0.172  0.144  0.248  0.270  0.177   
CASH  0.330  0.522  0.121  0.380  0.938  0.106   
GROWTH  0.122  0.086  0.108  0.129  0.109  0.102   
OPRISK  0.066  0.113  0.035  0.122  0.184  0.046  *** 
EXTITEMS  0.021  0.071  0.007  0.046  0.157  0.009  *** 
OPCF  0.096  0.074  0.092  0.061  0.148  0.070  *** 
CHDEBT  0.018  0.074  0.002  0.015  0.092  0.001   
CHEXTEQ  0.035  0.063  0.010  0.042  0.077  0.012   
AFINCF  0.053  0.088  0.033  0.058  0.121  0.037   
CAPEX  0.125  0.248  0.069  0.113  0.155  0.066   
ACQUIS  0.032  0.052  0.010  0.028  0.066  0.003   
DIVEST  0.054  0.242  0.002  0.040  0.138  0.002   
INVCF  0.104  0.097  0.089  0.101  0.111  0.082   
TCF  0.148  0.106  0.138  0.118  0.168  0.113  *** 
DIVREP  0.037  0.046  0.023  0.013  0.034  0.000  *** 
CHDIV  0.002  0.005  0.000  0.003  0.015  0.000  ** 
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Table 2C: Ex-Post Versus Ex-Ante Medians for Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
In this table, we calculate medians for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0) 
for all variables except ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV, for which we calculate means. Ex-ante means 
that variable calculations are based on three-year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). 
Ex-post means that calculations are based on three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 
0 to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV. A non-
parametric Mann/Whitney ranksum test on differences in medians between these two types of firms is conducted 
for all other variables. The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * 
denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
Event Firms (R1) 
 
Non-Repurchase Firms (R0)  Variables 
Ex-Ante  Ex-Post  Difference  Ex-Ante  Ex-Post  Difference 
MARKET-TO-BOOK  2.498  2.137  -0.361***  2.054  1.890  -0.164 
LEVERAGE  0.124  0.144  0.020  0.148  0.177  0.029 
CASH  0.167  0.121  -0.056**  0.124  0.106  -0.018 
GROWTH  0.115  0.108  -0.007*  0.120  0.102  -0.018*** 
OPRISK  0.035  0.035  0.000  0.039  0.046  0.007* 
EXTITEMS  0.018  0.021  0.030  0.030  0.046  0.016** 
OPCF  0.100  0.092  -0.008  0.071  0.070  -0.001 
CHDEBT  0.000  0.002  0.002**  0.004  0.001  -0.003 
CHEXTEQ  0.047  0.010  -0.037***  0.039  0.012  -0.027*** 
AFINCF  0.076  0.033  -0.042***  0.091  0.037  -0.054*** 
CAPEX  0.073  0.069  -0.004  0.076  0.066  -0.010 
ACQUIS  0.037  0.032  -0.050  0.034  0.028  -0.006 
DIVEST  0.034  0.054  0.020*  0.020  0.041  0.021*** 
INVCF  0.096  0.089  -0.007*  0.098  0.082  -0.016*** 
TCF  0.189  0.138  -0.061***  0.174  0.113  -0.061*** 
DIVREP  0.019  0.037  0.016***  0.015  0.013  -0.002 
CHDIV  0.006  0.002  -0.004***  0.006  0.003  -0.003** 
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Table  3-Panels  1  (Dividend  Payers)  and  2  (Non-Dividend  Payers):  Ex-Post  Versus  Ex-Ante 
Medians for Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
In this table, we calculate medians for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0) 
for all variables except ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV, for which we calculate means. Ex-ante means 
that variable calculations are based on three-year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). 
Ex-post means that calculations are based on three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 
0 to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV. A non-
parametric Mann/Whitney ranksum test on differences in medians between these two types of firms is conducted 
for all other variables. The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * 
denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Panel 1: Dividend Payers 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




MARKET-TO-BOOK  2.312  1.872  ***  2.137  1.899  **   
OPERATING RISK  0.024  0.030  **  0.027  0.039  ***   
GROWTH  0.094  0.092    0.085  0.088     
LEVERAGE  0.139  0.182  **  0.173  0.221  ***   
CASH  0.097  0.094    0.058  0.090    * 
OPCF  0.110  0.076  ***  0.096  0.078  ***   
EXTITEMS  0.011  0.022    0.015  0.037  **   
CHDEBT  0.003  0.010  *  0.006  0.004     
CHEXTEQ  0.025  0.035    0.005  0.007    *** 
AFINCF  0.055  0.086    0.020  0.024    *** 
CAPEX  0.079  0.063  *  0.061  0.063     
ACQUIS  0.036  0.044    0.028  0.039     
DIVEST  0.029  0.020    0.043  0.023     
INVCF  0.104  0.096    0.082  0.086    ** 
TCF  0.173  0.154    0.131  0.113  ***  *** 
DIVREP  0.035  0.012  ***  0.046  0.013  ***  * 
CHDIV  0.017  0.004  ***  0.005  0.003  **  *** 
 
 
Panel 2: Non-Dividend Payers 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




MARKET-TO-BOOK  2.598  2.145  ***  2.137  1.882  ***  *** 
OPERATING RISK  0.043  0.044    0.041  0.048  ***   
GROWTH  0.129  0.132    0.123  0.109     
LEVERAGE  0.113  0.137  **  0.129  0.163  **   
CASH  0.223  0.142  **  0.179  0.122  *  ** 
OPCF  0.094  0.069  ***  0.087  0.066  ***   
EXTITEMS  0.022  0.033    0.025  0.051  ***   
CHDEBT  0.000  0.002    0.000  0.000    ** 
CHEXTEQ  0.063  0.045    0.015  0.014    *** 
AFINCF  0.096  0.094    0.037  0.042    *** 
CAPEX  0.067  0.080    0.073  0.070     
ACQUIS  0.037  0.029  *  0.034  0.023  ***   
DIVEST  0.037  0.020  **  0.060  0.049    * 
INVCF  0.091  0.099    0.092  0.080  *   
TCF  0.199  0.186    0.140  0.112  ***  *** 
DIVREP  0.011  0.016    0.033  0.013  ***  *** 
CHDIV  0.000  0.007  ***  0.000  0.003  ***   
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Table 3-Panels 3 (Non-Acquisitions Sample) and 2 (Acquisitions Sample): Ex-Post Versus Ex-
Ante Medians for Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
In this table, we calculate medians for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0) 
for all variables except ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV, for which we calculate means. Ex-ante means 
that variable calculations are based on three-year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). 
Ex-post means that calculations are based on three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 
0 to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV. A non-
parametric Mann/Whitney ranksum test on differences in medians between these two types of firms is conducted 
for all other variables. The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * 
denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Panel 3: Non-Acquisitions Sample 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




MARKET-TO-BOOK  2.550  2.128  ***  2.432  1.697  ***   
OPERATING RISK  0.037  0.039    0.037  0.051  ***   
GROWTH  0.132  0.125    0.131  0.111  *   
LEVERAGE  0.104  0.156  ***  0.091  0.183  ***   
CASH  0.218  0.122  ***  0.189  0.114  ***   
OPCF  0.108  0.068  ***  0.101  0.073  ***   
EXTITEMS  0.018  0.017    0.015  0.008  *   
CHDEBT  -0.002  0.022  ***  0.000  0.000    *** 
CHEXTEQ  0.030  0.027    0.011  0.009    *** 
AFINCF  0.055  0.080  **  0.031  0.025    ** 
CAPEX  0.079  0.080    0.080  0.062  **   
ACQUIS  0.000  0.028  ***  0.017  0.020    *** 
DIVEST  0.040  0.015  **  0.063  0.036     
INVCF  0.070  0.097  ***  0.084  0.077    * 
TCF  0.172  0.165    0.146  0.112  ***  *** 
DIVREP  0.019  0.014    0.042  0.015  ***  *** 
CHDIV  0.006  0.005    0.002  0.003    *** 
 
Panel 4: Acquisitions Sample 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




MARKET-TO-BOOK  2.482  2.039  ***  1.983  1.975    *** 
OPERATING RISK  0.033  0.040  ***  0.031  0.041  ***   
GROWTH  0.093  0.117  **  0.090  0.098    * 
LEVERAGE  0.146  0.130    0.183  0.172     
CASH  0.136  0.130    0.080  0.098  *  *** 
OPCF  0.094  0.073  ***  0.085  0.065  ***   
EXTITEMS  0.005  0.006    0.008  0.011    *** 
CHDEBT  0.002  0.006  ***  0.004  0.001     
CHEXTEQ  0.057  0.047    0.009  0.013    *** 
AFINCF  0.094  0.099    0.036  0.047    *** 
CAPEX  0.064  0.072    0.060  0.071  *   
ACQUIS  0.067  0.039  ***  0.044  0.035  *  *** 
DIVEST  0.030  0.024    0.047  0.044     
INVCF  0.119  0.099  **  0.092  0.085    *** 
TCF  0.197  0.185    0.130  0.116  **  *** 
DIVREP  0.018  0.015    0.033  0.012  ***  *** 
CHDIV  0.005  0.006    0.002  0.003  **  ** 
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Table 3-Panels 5 (Negative External Financing) and 6 (Positive External Financing): Ex-Post 
Versus Ex-Ante Medians for Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
In this table, we calculate medians for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0) 
for all variables except ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV, for which we calculate means. Ex-ante means 
that variable calculations are based on three-year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). 
Ex-post means that calculations are based on three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 
0 to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV. A non-
parametric Mann/Whitney ranksum test on differences in medians between these two types of firms is conducted 
for all other variables. The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * 
denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Panel 5: Negative External Financing 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




MARKET-TO-BOOK  1.759  1.690    1.967  1.692    ** 
OPERATING RISK  0.029  0.038  *  0.029  0.040  **   
GROWTH  0.091  0.108  *  0.086  0.100     
LEVERAGE  0132  0.195  ***  0.123  0.224  ***   
CASH  0.073  0.087    0.081  0.086     
OPCF  0.123  0.076  ***  0.108  0.084  ***   
EXTITEMS  0.007  0.004    0.005  0.008     
CHDEBT  -0.069  0.015  ***  -0.000  0.011  **  *** 
CHEXTEQ  0.003  0.023  ***  0.004  0.005     
AFINCF  -0.029  0.070  ***  0.015  0.029  **  *** 
CAPEX  0.071  0.077    0.067  0.073     
ACQUIS  0.014  0.025  *  0.026  0.025    * 
DIVEST  0.027  0.018    0.016  0.038  *   
INVCF  0.076  0.083  *  0.089  0.090    * 
TCF  0.085  0.157  ***  0.141  0.116    *** 
DIVREP  0.016  0.017    0.044  0.019  ***  *** 
CHDIV  0.007  0.007    0.003  0.006    * 
 
Panel 6: Positive External Financing 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




MARKET-TO-BOOK  2.700  2.141  ***  2.162  1.899  ***  *** 
OPERATING RISK  0.037  0.040  **  0.036  0.047  ***   
GROWTH  0.122  0.122    0.112  0.103    ** 
LEVERAGE  0.123  0.141  ***  0.150  0.172  **  * 
CASH  0.210  0.131  **  0.147  0.113    *** 
OPCF  0.094  0.069  ***  0.089  0.068  ***   
EXTITEMS  0.005  0.005    0.007  0.010    *** 
CHDEBT  0.007  0.003    0.003  0.000  *   
CHEXTEQ  0.071  0.043  ***  0.013  0.013    *** 
AFINCF  0.101  0.096    0.036  0.039    *** 
CAPEX  0.073  0.077    0.070  0.066     
ACQUIS  0.041  0.036    0.033  0.029    ** 
DIVEST  0.036  0.020  **  0.062  0.041    * 
INVCF  0.102  0.099    0.089  0.081    *** 
TCF  0.211  0.182  ***  0.135  0.113  ***  *** 
DIVREP  0.019  0.014    0.036  0.012  ***  *** 
CHDIV  0.005  0.006    0.002  0.003  **  *** 
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Table 3-Panels 7 (Cash Financed Repurchases), 8 (Debt Financed Repurchases) and 9 (Other 
Than Debt and Cash Financed Repurchases): Ex-Post Versus Ex-Ante Medians for Event Firms 
and Non-Repurchase Firms 
In this table, we calculate medians for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0) 
for all variables except ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV, for which we calculate means. Ex-ante means 
that variable calculations are based on three-year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). 
Ex-post means that calculations are based on three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 
0 to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV. A non-
parametric Mann/Whitney ranksum test on differences in medians between these two types of firms is conducted 
for all other variables. The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * 
denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Panel 7: Cash Financed Repurchases 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




MARKET-TO-BOOK  2.477  1.940  *  2.010  1.954    ** 
OPERATING RISK  0.034  0.042  **  0.028  0.044  ***   
GROWTH  0.109  0.108    0.116  0.095     
LEVERAGE  0.165  0.150    0.076  0.171  ***  *** 
CASH  0.194  0.120  *  0.084  0.104    *** 
OPCF  0.088  0.066  ***  0.085  0.072  *   
EXTITEMS  0.006  0.006    0.006  0.009     
CHDEBT  -0.003  0.000  **  -0.000  0.000  *   
CHEXTEQ  0.068  0.034  *  0.007  0.012    *** 
AFINCF  0.062  0.071    0.016  0.030  ***  *** 
CAPEX  0.066  0.071    0.063  0.061     
ACQUIS  0.038  0.030    0.029  0.023     
DIVEST  0.034  0.017  *  0.064  0.049     
INVCF  0.083  0.096    0.078  0.078     
TCF  0.175  0.156    0.106  0.120    *** 
DIVREP  0.013  0.016    0.032  0.013  ***  *** 




Panel 8: Debt Financed Repurchases 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




MARKET-TO-BOOK  1.956  2.156    2.129  1.948     
OPERATING RISK  0.031  0.036    0.038  0.048     
GROWTH  0.122  0.127    0.113  0.110     
LEVERAGE  0.142  0.141    0.269  0.167  ***  *** 
CASH  0.054  0.090  ***  0.104  0.112    *** 
OPCF  0.073  0.056  *  0.083  0.070     
EXTITEMS  0.005  0.006    0.005  0.008     
CHDEBT  0.024  0.017    0.049  0.000  ***  ** 
CHEXTEQ  0.025  0.051  **  0.009  0.013    * 
AFINCF  0.081  0.123  **  0.078  0.043     
CAPEX  0.078  0.082    0.062  0074     
ACQUIS  0.039  0.040    0.036  0.024     
DIVEST  0.022  0.030    0.050  0.045     
INVCF  0.104  0.125    0.089  0.087     
TCF  0.179  0.192    0.159  0.117  ***   
DIVREP  0.014  0.024    0.030  0.011  ***  ** 
CHDIV  0.008  0.007    0.001  0.002    ** 
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Panel 9: Non-Debt or Cash Financed Repurchases 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




MARKET-TO-BOOK  2.655  2.059  ***  2.214  1.771  ***  *** 
OPERATING RISK  0.036  0.038    0.037  0.045  ***   
GROWTH  0.116  0.124    0.103  0.103     
LEVERAGE  0.112  0.152  ***  0.143  0.183  ***  * 
CASH  0.199  0.136  **  0.135  0.103    *** 
OPCF  0.106  0.075  ***  0.098  0.069  ***   
EXTITEMS  0.004  0.004    0.008  0.010     
CHDEBT  0.000  0.005    0.001  0.001     
CHEXTEQ  0.048  0.039    0.012  0.011    *** 
AFINCF  0.080  0.093    0.035  0.040    *** 
CAPEX  0.074  0.075    0.071  0.065     
ACQUIS  0.036  0.035    0.032  0.031     
DIVEST  0.037  0.019  **  0.051  0.036     
INVCF  0.099  0.096    0.095  0.082     
TCF  0.200  0.177  **  0.147  0.108  ***  *** 
DIVREP  0.022  0.012  **  0.041  0.014  ***  *** 
CHDIV  0.006  0.005    0.002  0.003    ** 
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Table  3-Panels  10  (Non-Significant  Divesting  Firms  -  less  than  5pp)  and  11  (Significant 
Divesting Firms - more than 5pp): Ex-Post Versus Ex-Ante Medians for Event Firms and Non-
Repurchase Firms 
In this table, we calculate medians for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0) 
for all variables except ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV, for which we calculate means. Ex-ante means 
that variable calculations are based on three-year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). 
Ex-post means that calculations are based on three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 
0 to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for ACQUIS, DIVEST, DIVREP and CHDIV. A non-
parametric Mann/Whitney ranksum test on differences in medians between these two types of firms is conducted 
for all other variables. The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * 
denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Panel 10: Non-Significant Divesting Firms (less than 5pp) 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




MARKET-TO-BOOK  2.526  2.128  ***  2.109  1.950  *  *** 
OPERATING RISK  0.035  0.040  **  0.034  0.048  ***   
GROWTH  0.104  0.117  *  0.101  0098     
LEVERAGE  0.121  0.140  **  0.131  0.170  **   
CASH  0.153  0.131    0.110  0.123    * 
OPCF  0.097  0.066  ***  0.091  0.062  ***   
EXTITEMS  0.004  0.004    0.007  0.009    *** 
CHDEBT  0.000  0.004  **  0.003  0.006    *** 
CHEXTEQ  0.056  0.044    0.010  0.013    *** 
AFINCF  0.078  0.091  *  0.034  0.040    *** 
CAPEX  0.058  0.068  ***  0.058  0.060  *   
ACQUIS  0.041  0.033  *  0.035  0.027  **   
DIVEST  0.001  0.019  ***  0.016  0.038  ***  *** 
INVCF  0.091  0.091    0.085  0.078     
TCF  0.187  0.170  **  0.135  0.110  ***  *** 
DIVREP  0.019  0.012  **  0.037  0.011  ***  *** 
CHDIV  0.006  0.004    0.002  0.003    *** 
 
 
Panel 11: Significant Divesting Firms (more than 5pp)  
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




MARKET-TO-BOOK  2.443  1.892  ***  2.169  1.710  ***   
OPERATING RISK  0.035  0.039    0.036  0.041  *   
GROWTH  0.132  0.132    0.115  0.111     
LEVERAGE  0.132  0.165  **  0.158  0.203  **   
CASH  0.184  0.101  ***  0.151  0.086  *   
OPCF  0.109  0.076  ***  0.094  0.085     
EXTITEMS  0.007  0.006    0.006  0.010  **   
CHDEBT  0.003  0.007    0.002  0.001     
CHEXTEQ  0.041  0.032    0.010  0.012    *** 
AFINCF  0.073  0.091    0.030  0.032    *** 
CAPEX  0.123  0.091  ***  0.104  0.077  ***   
ACQUIS  0.028  0.037    0.027  0.030     
DIVEST  0.097  0.021  ***  0.125  0.044  ***   
INVCF  0.105  0.113    0.094  0.095     
TCF  0.192  0.190    0.141  0.122    *** 
DIVREP  0.017  0.020    0.038  0.018  ***  * 
CHDIV  0.004  0.009  **  0.002  0.004  **  ** 
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Table 4-Panel 1: Logistic Regressions of Initial Repurchase Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms - 
All Observations 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions predicting initial repurchasing likelihood for a 
sample of initial repurchase firms and a matched-pairs control sample of non-repurchase firms. The first model 
uses absolute values for all variables, except equilibrium equations from cash flow statements. The second model 
employs the same absolute values for all variables and changes (ex-post values less ex-ante values) in some 
variables  to  allow  empirical  testing  for  selected  hypotheses.  Definitions  of  the  variables  employed  here  are 
provided in Table 1.  
Model 1  Model 2  Variables 
Coef.  p-value  Signif.  Coef.  p-value  Signif. 
MARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.000  0.968    -0.053  0.064  * 
OPERATING RISK  -1.188  0.079  *  -3.197  0.001  *** 
GROWTH  -1.732  0.026  **  -0.933  0.290   
LEVERAGE  -1.342  0.000  ***  -1.171  0.001  *** 
CASH  -0.110  0.109    -0.175  0.181   
OPCF  3.430  0.000  ***  2.121  0.072  * 
EXTITEMS  0.607  0.489    0.194  0.818   
CHDEBT  0.502  0.523    1.469  0.079  * 
CHEXTEQ  0.855  0.185    1.008  0.158   
CAPEX  -0.664  0.342    -0.395  0.690   
ACQUIS  0.366  0.726    1.312  0.339   
DIVEST  2.437  0.011  **  2.250  0.071  * 
DIVREP  1.407  0.245    49.46  0.000  *** 
CHDIV  -6.540  0.150    -149.4  0.000  *** 
CHMARKET-TO-BOOK        -0.064  0.018  ** 
CHOPERATING RISK        -1.433  0.049  ** 
CHGROWTH        0.428  0.698   
CHLEVERAGE        -1.170  0.008  *** 
CHCASH        -0.019  0.926   
CHOPCF        0.248  0.768   
CHCAPEX        0.631  0.503   
CHACQUIS        1.412  0.197   
CHDIVEST        -0.611  0.610   
CHDIVREP        49.97  0.000  *** 
CHCHDIV        -146.5  0.000  *** 
McFadden R-squared      4.82%      20.24% 
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Table 4-Panel 2: Logistic Regressions of Initial Repurchase Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms - 
Dividend Payers and Non-Dividend Payers 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions predicting initial repurchasing likelihood from 
a sample of initial repurchase firms and a matched-pairs control sample of non-repurchase firms. The model 
employs the same absolute values for all variables and changes (ex-post values less ex-ante values) in some 
variables  to  allow  empirical  testing  for  selected  hypotheses.  Definitions  of  the  variables  employed  here  are 






Coef.  p-value  Signif.  Coef.  p-value  Signif. 
MARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.059  0.445    -0.083  0.021  ** 
OPERATING RISK  -4.665  0.014  **  -3.224  0.000  *** 
GROWTH  -2.205  0.247    -1.552  0.189   
LEVERAGE  -1.775  0.026  **  -1.322  0.006  *** 
CASH  -0.719  0.250    -0.241  0.258   
OPCF  3.402  0.206    3.096  0.062  * 
EXTITEMS  -5.444  0.071  *  1.191  0.218   
CHDEBT  0.646  0.721    2.684  0.048  ** 
CHEXTEQ  0.003  0.999    1.570  0.146   
CAPEX  1.711  0.350    -1.013  0.421   
ACQUIS  -2.214  0.432    2.631  0.247   
DIVEST  -0.728  0.780    3.560  0.035  ** 
DIVREP  61.39  0.002  ***  59.64  0.000  *** 
CHDIV  -149.1  0.014  **  -2007  0.000  *** 
CHMARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.056  0.470    -0.110  0.001  *** 
CHOPERATING RISK  -1.441  0.530    -1.103  0.056  * 
CHGROWTH  1.915  0.522    0.292  0.819   
CHLEVERAGE  -1.106  0.263    -1.277  0.027  ** 
CHCASH  -0.309  0.622    -0.049  0.874   
CHOPCF  -3.860  0.178    0.327  0.687   
CHCAPEX  0.225  0.910    0.963  0.432   
CHACQUIS  -0.607  0.756    3.954  0.048  ** 
CHDIVEST  1.049  0.658    -1.627  0.351   
CHDIVREP  56.66  0.003  ***  56.80  0.000  *** 
CHCHDIV  -170.5  0.005  ***  -85.58  0.018  ** 
McFadden R-squared      27.89%      35.93% 
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Table 4-Panel 3: Logistic Regressions of Initial Repurchase Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms - 
Acquisition Firms and Non-Acquisition Firms 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions predicting initial repurchasing likelihood for a 
sample  of  initial  repurchase  firms  and  a  matched-pairs  control  sample  of  non-repurchase  firms.  The  model 
employs the same absolute values for all variables and changes (ex-post values less ex-ante values) in some 
variables  to  allow  empirical  testing  for  selected  hypotheses.  Definitions  of  the  variables  employed  here  are 
provided in Table 1.  
Acquisition Firms 
 
Non-Acquisition Firms  Variables 
Coef.  p-value  Signif.  Coef.  p-value  Signif. 
MARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.097  0.023  **  -0.025  0.601   
OPERATING RISK  -2.425  0.124    -3.229  0.021  ** 
GROWTH  -1.429  0.288    0.185  0.897   
LEVERAGE  -0.993  0.037  **  -1.561  0.005  *** 
CASH  -0.103  0.409    -0.034  0.855   
OPCF  2.648  0.083  *  1.663  0.382   
EXTITEMS  -1.871  0.426    1.864  0.154   
CHDEBT  0.455  0.701    0.609  0.662   
CHEXTEQ  -0.393  0.714    1.477  0.213   
CAPEX  -0.335  0.823    0.687  0.687   
ACQUIS  6.529  0.000  ***       
DIVEST  2.417  0.231    3.255  0.198   
DIVREP  59.96  0.001  ***  41.56  0.002  *** 
CHDIV  -184.6  0.000  ***  -118.8  0.003  *** 
CHMARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.118  0.001  ***  -0.049  0.241   
CHOPERATING RISK  -2.265  0.011  **  -1.366  0.256   
CHGROWTH  0.878  0.468    1.744  0.355   
CHLEVERAGE  -0.209  0.750    -2.679  0.002  *** 
CHCASH  0.065  0.759    0.087  0.820   
CHOPCF  1.875  0.230    -0.861  0.511   
CHCAPEX  -1.112  0.393    1.548  0.340   
CHACQUIS  1.732  0.157    13.12  0.000  *** 
CHDIVEST  1.047  0.544    -1.182  0.474   
CHDIVREP  57.04  0.001  ***  40.75  0.001  *** 
CHCHDIV  -178.4  0.000  ***  -110.5  0.004  *** 
McFadden R-squared      25.15%      23.55% 
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Table 4-Panel 4: Logistic Regressions of Initial Repurchase Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms - 
Negative and Positive External Financing Firms 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions predicting initial repurchasing likelihood for a 
sample  of  initial  repurchase  firms  and  a  matched-pairs  control  sample  of  non-repurchase  firms.  The  model 
employs the same absolute values for all variables and changes (ex-post values less ex-ante values) in some 
variables  to  allow  empirical  testing  for  selected  hypotheses.  Definitions  of  the  variables  employed  here  are 
provided in Table 1.  
Negative External Financing Firms  Positive External Financing Firms  Variables 
Coef.  p-value  Signif.  Coef.  p-value  Signif. 
MARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.298  0.162    -0.048  0.074  * 
OPERATING RISK  -1.263  0.826    -4.049  0.000  *** 
GROWTH  5.197  0.299    -1.351  0.162   
LEVERAGE  -4.507  0.117    -1.492  0.000  *** 
CASH  -0.075  0.965    -0.311  0.059  * 
OPCF  13.08  0.144    2.825  0.029  ** 
EXTITEMS  0.164  0.983    0.438  0.618   
CHDEBT  -26.75  0.105    4.221  0.000  *** 
CHEXTEQ  -22.56  0.072  *  2.254  0.006  *** 
CAPEX  -6.068  0.450    -0.920  0.407   
ACQUIS  10.30  0.175    -0.330  0.824   
DIVEST  9.264  0.356    2.631  0.058   
DIVREP  14.24  0.338    48.86  0.000  *** 
CHDIV  -100.1  0.020  **  -145.6  0.000  *** 
CHMARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.428  0.047  **  -0.057  0.021  ** 
CHOPERATING RISK  -1.149  0.779    -1.692  0.032  ** 
CHGROWTH  9.319  0.128    -0.102  0.935   
CHLEVERAGE  -8.312  0.000  ***  -0.638  0.192   
CHCASH  0.172  0.854    -0.164  0.444   
CHOPCF  2.470  0.660    0.680  0.444   
CHCAPEX  -2.817  0.606    0.964  0.376   
CHACQUIS  9.023  0.014  **  1.020  0.378   
CHDIVEST  -3.016  0.674    -0.696  0.607   
CHDIVREP  65.35  0.000  ***  49.15  0.000  *** 
CHCHDIV  -126.9  0.013  **  -142.1  0.000  *** 
McFadden R-squared      57.82%      20.81% 
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Table 4-Panel 5: Logistic Regressions of Initial Repurchase Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms - 
Cash Financed and Debt Financed Initial Repurchase Firms 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions predicting initial repurchasing likelihood for a 
sample  of  initial  repurchase  firms  and  a  matched-pairs  control  sample  of  non-repurchase  firms.  The  model 
employs the same absolute values for all variables and changes (ex-post values less ex-ante values) in some 
variables  to  allow  empirical  testing  for  selected  hypotheses.  Definitions  of  the  variables  employed  here  are 
provided in Table 1. 
Cash Financed  Debt Financed  Variables 
Coef.  p-value  Signif.  Coef.  p-value  Signif. 
MARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.158  0.076  *  0.105  0.442   
OPERATING RISK  -3.291  0.385    -2.967  0.549   
GROWTH  8.666  0.030  **  0.755  0.857   
LEVERAGE  -3.576  0.014  **  0.920  0.524   
CASH  -2.222  0.001  ***  -2.522  0.011  ** 
OPCF  13.67  0.008  ***  -4.037  0.418   
EXTITEMS  -8.913  0.014  **  1.809  0.322   
CHDEBT  11.72  0.004  ***  1.969  0.637   
CHEXTEQ  12.44  0.001  ***  -0.608  0.874   
CAPEX  -18.08  0.001  ***  -2.198  0.667   
ACQUIS  9.278  0.080  *  -3.373  0.543   
DIVEST  14.92  0.001  ***  -3.188  0.696   
DIVREP  17.45  0.264    73.10  0.044  ** 
CHDIV  -114.6  0.007  ***  -240.3  0.060  * 
CHMARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.294  0.001  ***  0.070  0.564   
CHOPERATING RISK  -7.154  0.008  ***  -6.188  0.057  * 
CHGROWTH  12.52  0.102    12.57  0.033  ** 
CHLEVERAGE  -16.08  0.000  ***  7.644  0.004  *** 
CHCASH  -2.561  0.001  ***  3.204  0.010  *** 
CHOPCF  -3.708  0.325    -8.421  0.116   
CHCAPEX  -24.17  0.000  ***  -10.55  0.046  ** 
CHACQUIS  5.820  0.200    2.397  0.610   
CHDIVEST  23.45  0.000  ***  13.21  0.025  ** 
CHDIVREP  30.94  0.006  ***  104.4  0.001  *** 
CHCHDIV  -126.2  0.001  ***  -283.9  0.013  ** 
McFadden R-squared      64.25%      43.01% 
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Table 4-Panel 6: Logistic Regressions of Initial Repurchase Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms - 
Significant and Non-Significant Divesting Firms 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions predicting initial repurchasing likelihood for a 
sample  of  initial  repurchase  firms  and  a  matched-pairs  control  sample  of  non-repurchase  firms.  The  model 
employs the same absolute values for all variables and changes (ex-post values less ex-ante values) in some 
variables  to  allow  empirical  testing  for  selected  hypotheses.  Definitions  of  the  variables  employed  here  are 
provided in Table 1.  
Significant Divesting Firms  Non-Significant Divesting Firms  Variables 
Coef.  p-value  Signif.  Coef.  p-value  Signif. 
MARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.019  0.770    -0.087  0.017  ** 
OPERATING RISK  -3.908  0.021  **  -4.118  0.021  ** 
GROWTH  -0.188  0.913    -2.161  0.073  * 
LEVERAGE  -1.374  0.034  **  -1.000  0.051  * 
CASH  -0.329  0.385    -0.430  0.169   
OPCF  0.806  0.738    3.438  0.025  ** 
EXTITEMS  2.043  0.057  *  2.728  0.091  * 
CHDEBT  1.703  0.284    2.257  0.038  ** 
CHEXTEQ  -0.134  0.940    1.677  0.078  * 
CAPEX  0.394  0.814    -0.028  0.985   
ACQUIS  -1.208  0.594    2.111  0.292   
DIVEST  8.860  0.004  ***  -244.7  0.000  *** 
DIVREP  30.57  0.043  **  73.76  0.000  *** 
CHDIV  -129.6  0.007  ***  -170.7  0.000  *** 
CHMARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.040  0.515    -0.087  0.014  ** 
CHOPERATING RISK  -0.571  0.537    -1.425  0.386   
CHGROWTH  0.597  0.800    0.347  0.824   
CHLEVERAGE  -1.785  0.017  **  -0.713  0.261   
CHCASH  -0.058  0.880    -0.254  0.559   
CHOPCF  -1.214  0.586    1.381  0.324   
CHCAPEX  1.376  0.444    -0.857  0.581   
CHACQUIS  0.196  0.893    3.072  0.089  * 
CHDIVEST  -1.321  0.559    1.152  0.570   
CHDIVREP  27.44  0.055    77.25  0.000  *** 
CHCHDIV  -86.97  0.070  **  -175.5  0.000  *** 
McFadden R-squared      20.82%      38.93% 
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Table 4-Panel 7: Logistic Regressions of Initial Repurchase Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms - 
Size Quartiles 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions predicting initial repurchasing likelihood for a 
sample  of  initial  repurchase  firms  and  a  matched-pairs  control  sample  of  non-repurchase  firms.  The  model 
employs the same absolute values for all variables and changes (ex-post values less ex-ante values) in some 
variables  to  allow  empirical  testing  for  selected  hypotheses.  Definitions  of  the  variables  employed  here  are 
provided in Table 1.  
Size Quartile 1  Size Quartile 2  Size Quartile 3  Size Quartile 4  Variables 
Coeff  Signif.  Coeff  Signif.  Coeff  Signif.  Coeff  Signif. 
MARKET-TO-BOOK  -0.11  *  -0.03    -0.00    -0.04   
OPERATING RISK  -1.32    -0.36    -6.66  ***  -6.69  ** 
GROWTH  -1.40    -2.80    -0.17    -0.48   
LEVERAGE  -0.13    -1.06    -2.02  **  -1.04   
CASH  0.06    -0.96    -0.60    -0.18   
OPCF  3.78  **  4.85  **  2.33    -0.77   
EXTITEMS  -2.34    1.97    2.80  *  -1.34   
CHDEBT  2.23    3.29    3.54  *  -4.05  * 
CHEXTEQ  3.21  **  2.72    -0.27    -2.69   
CAPEX  1.02    -1.72    1.03    1.04   
ACQUIS  0.61    -0.68    -1.31    0.37   
DIVEST  -0.20    4.66    1.23    3.09   
DIVREP  73.6  ***  107  ***  50.0  ***  21.3   
CHDIV  -160  *  -320  ***  -168  ***  -78.1  * 
CHMARKET-BOOK  -0.09    -0.07    -0.15    -0.08   
CHOPERATING RISK  0.07    -0.76    -5.92  ***  -4.03  ** 
CHGROWTH  -5.02  *  3.37    5.19  *  2.30   
CHLEVERAGE  0.68    -2.56  *  -2.36  **  -1.48   
CHCASH  0.25    -0.65    -0.62    -0.39   
CHOPCF  0.71    1.93    -074    3.76   
CHCAPEX  6.29  **  -3.29    1.46    -1.06   
CHACQUIS  1.66    2.13    1.09    -3.82   
CHDIVEST  -5.51  *  0.23    -6.99  *  5.27  ** 
CHDIVREP  71.3  **  107  ***  50.6  ***  26.0  * 
CHCHDIV  -137  *  -314  ***  -160  ***  -94.1  ** 
McFadden R-squared    17.96%    18.78%    20.95%    22.31% 
 
 